Larger groups may alleviate collective action problems
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper shows how larger group size can enhance punishing behavior in social dilemmas and hence support higher levels of cooperation. We focus on describing conict technology using Lanchesters equations and study the role of collectivityof punishment to support cooperation in large groups. The main results suggest that as long as defectors are, even slightly, less collectivethan punishers, Lanchesters law can be applied to show that a smaller proportion of punishers can successfully eliminate defectors as the size of the population increases.
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