Policy Stability under Di erent Electoral
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper looks at the stability of policy outcomes under di erent electoral systems. The political game among parties and party supporters of di erent ideologies involves pre-election coalition formation as well as after-election parliamentary bargaining. Voters' preferences vary across districts and over time. We show that under proportional representation there exists a unique stable policy, whereas the policy outcomes under plurality voting are unstable. Moreover, we nd that under plurality voting there exist strong incentives for pre-election coalition formation, which are absent under proportional representation. The comparative results may be di erent depending on the interaction of strategic voting and strategic party coordination.
منابع مشابه
Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Di ff erent Electoral Systems ∗
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