Shoemaker on Phenomenal Content

In a series of papers and lectures, Sydney Shoemaker has developed a sophisticated Russellian theory of phenomenal content (1994, 2000, 2001, 2003). It has as its central motivation two considerations. One is the possibility of spectrum-inversion without illusion. The other is the transparency of experience. Consider the possibility of spectrum inversion. It might be that the color experience Jack has when viewing a red thing is phenomenally identical to the experience Jill has when looking at a green thing. It is conceivable that there could be two subjects who are spectrum inverted relative to each other. In fact, it has been argued that it is likely that there are actual cases of behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion (NidaRumelin 1996). Suppose that Jack is looking at a strawberry and that Jill is looking at a lime. The strawberry and lime could be such that, due to their being spectrum inverted relative to each other, Jack and Jill are having phenomenally identical color experiences. It seems also that neither Jack nor Jill need be misperceiving the color of the fruit. After all, the