Political Survival and International Hierarchy : Evidence from

The choice to give up sovereignty to another state helps explain the development of international hierarchy, while resistance often results in conflict as states instead use coercion to assert their control. This paper develops an explanation of why actors support giving up sovereignty to another state. The argument uses domestic politics to explain hierarchy, expanding beyond the existing literature’s focus on states as unitary actors and macro-institutions. Elites support surrendering sovereignty when political contestation is combined with rent-seeking. Rentseeking links power to economic well-being, so losing political power results in a significant reduction of economic welfare. Contestation increases the probability that power will be lost. Under these conditions elites have incentives to exchange sovereignty for resources from the external actor to preserve their political position. Rent-seeking also aligns the interests of elites with their supporters, as individuals often rely on patronage. This alignment is necessary as elites depend on domestic support for their power. Given threats from other elites, these individuals support surrendering sovereignty to ensure their patron’s political survival. The theory is tested using a subnational case-study and survey data from Georgia. Jesse Dillon Savage Harriman Institute Columbia University [email protected]