On Markovian equilibria and entry games
نویسنده
چکیده
Dynamic entry games are revisited using a Markovian solution concept based on the introduction of long and short time players. This approach provides new insights on the economics of potential competition in particular relative to rent dissipation and selection issues. Potential competition appears less attractive from a normative standpoint. Journal of Economic Literature ClassiÞcation Numbers : C73, D43, L12.
منابع مشابه
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
We study non-zero-sum continuous-time stochastic games, also known as continuous-time Markov games, of fixed duration. We concentrate on Markovian strategies. We show by way of example that equilibria need not exist in Markovian strategies, but they always exist in Markovian publicsignal correlated strategies. To do so, we develop criteria for a strategy profile to be an equilibrium via differe...
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