Tacit Knowledge: A Wittgensteinian Approach

Key Words: Wittgenstein, K.S. Johannessen, the strong thesis of tacit knowledge, intransitive understanding, pragmatic turn in epistemology. Influenced by later Wittgenstein's philosophy, a group of Scandinavian philosophers, with K.S.Johannessen as the leading figure, make a unique contribution to the ongoing discussion of tacit knowledge. They differentiate the strong and the weak interpretations of tacit knowledge, and put their emphasis on the former. Based upon his practice-centered interpretation of later Wittgenstein's philosophy, Johannessen makes much out of Wittgenstein's notion of intransitive understanding to argue for the strong thesis of tacit knowledge and advocates a pragmatic turn in epistemology. In the ongoing discussion of tacit knowing/knowledge, the Scandinavian Wittgensteinians are a very active force. In close connection with the Swedish Center for Working Life in Stockholm, their work provides us with a wonderful example of the fruitful collaboration between philosophical reflection and empirical research. In the Wittgensteinian approach to the problem of tacit knowing/knowledge, Kell S. Johannessen is the leading figure. In addition, philosophers like Harald Grimen, Bengt Molander and Allan Janik also make contributions to the discussion in their own ways. In this paper, I will try to clarify the main points of their contribution to the discussion of tacit knowing/knowledge. According to Johannessen, one of the salient features of the traditional conception of knowledge is that it is basically propositionally oriented, that is, it underscores the inner relationship between knowledge and language. Anything qualified as knowledge must be capable of being articulated by verbal means, or in some notational form. 1 The historical development of this propositionally-oriented understanding of knowledge is briefly delineated by the Wittgensteinians. Harald Grimen suggests its origin in Greek philosophy. 2 For instance, in Plato's dialogue Laches, the theme of which is courage, Socrates claims that " And that which we know we must surely be able to tell. " 3 Laches, who is a distinguished general, says: " I fancy that I do know the nature of courage, but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I cannot get hold of her and tell her nature. " 4 According to Socrates' standard, now that Laches cannot tell the nature of courage, he does not know what it is. The idea that what counts as knowledge must be capable of being verbally articulated and what cannot be told is not knowledge was strengthened in modern times. As Johannessen points out, from Galileo's famous …