Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of socialchoice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no limit on ties or beliefs about them.
منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 17 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2000