On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs
نویسندگان
چکیده
Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that these solutionscan all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are studied and two characterizations on subclasses of games are provided. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71. 1991 Mathematics Subject Classification Number: 90D12.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 32 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004