Activism, Costly Participation, and Polarization

I develop a model of activism and polarization in the context of electoral competition. Two candidates simultaneously announce policy platforms and seek the support of ideologically inclined party activists. Activists compete to influence electoral outcomes by expending costly support for their respective candidates. I show that the presence of activists always moderates the platform choice of candidates, compared to the case of no activism. Next, I establish that, under certain parameter conditions, increased polarization among activists can lead to lesser polarization of candidate platforms – meaning candidates compromise rather than diverge in equilibrium. Further, I precisely characterize the conditions under which the presence of activism, and increasing partisanship among activists, are both welfare-improving for voters. Finally, I identify a novel crowding out effect of big money on the demand for activism. My analysis suggests public funding of elections as an important institutional reform that could mitigate the pernicious effects of high polarization.