Humean Reductionism About Laws Of Nature

§0 Introduction By far the most central and important question about laws of nature is this: Are they mere patterns in the phenomena (patterns that are in some way salient, to be sure—but still, nothing more than patterns)? Or are they something more, something that somehow governs or constrains those phenomena? Disagreement over this issue constitutes the Schism in contemporary philosophical work on laws of nature. Here, I will investigate the prospects for an important position that falls under the “mere patterns” approach: what, for reasons that will emerge, I call “Humean reductionism” about laws of nature. I will review the most prominent arguments against this position from the literature, and add some of my own that, I think, are more effective. All the same, “investigate” remains the operative word. The value of the various anti-Humean arguments lies not so much in their power to refute, as in their power to force a much sharper and more sophisticated articulation of a Humean position capable of resisting them. So, while I immodestly claim that my own anti-Humean arguments are the best out there, I offer them with only the modest aim of improving our understanding of the Schism.