Fisheries in Chile: Small Pelagics, Management, Rights, and Sea Zoning

Fishery-management policies based on the allocation of exclusive fishing rights, territorial use rights, and sea zoning are recurrent tools for achieving sustainability. In Chile, the 1991 Fishery and Aquaculture Law reformed division of the right to fish between the artisan and industrial subsectors, introduced sea-zoning (spacebased) strategies, and established a differential individual transferable quota (ITQ) system. Here, I describe these arrangements and focus on the small-pelagic artisan and industrial purse-seine fishery. Results show that the reform and empowerment of the artisan fishers, due to new governance, has lead to increases in the artisan fleet and landings but to decreases for the industrial sector. The reform appears to have counteracted the inherent “race for fish” characteristic of common-pool resources in open-access systems. Marine fisheries are in trouble, and prevailing rules and paradigms are evolving (Botsford et al., 1997; Caddy, 1999; Hilborn et al., 2003; Myers and Worm, 2003; Castilla and Defeo, 2005; Geoffrey and Schlenker, 2008; Townsend and Shotton, 2008), but the transition has not proven smooth (Pauly et al., 2002, 2003; Mace, 2004; Parma et al., 2006; Grafton et al., 2008). McClanahan and Castilla (2007) and Townsend et al. (2008) published a collection of 44 fishery management case studies, which includes a wide range of marine resources (benthic, pelagic), habitats (intertidal, inner-inshore), and fishing gears (diving, dredging). They review fishery management approaches with emphasis on sea-zoning (space-based) management, comanagement, partnership, and self-governance. Whether all the cases, ranging from subsistence or artisan (small) to mid-scale fisheries, can be labeled success stories is open to discussion. Nevertheless, they represent a unique collection of examples highlighting emerging sustainable fishery-management approaches. The two overarching management paradigms embraced in the studies are comanagement (Castilla and Defeo, 2001; Makino and Matsuda, 2005; Eggert and Ulmestrand, 2008; McClanahan et al., 2009) and sea-zoning approaches (Castilla, 1994, 2008; Castilla et al., 1998; Young et al., 2007). Both call attention to the need to move away from single-species management and top-down governance through command-control mechanisms. The new call, particularly in the case of sea-zoning arrangements, is to consider biophysical variables (including uncertainties), fisher/stakeholders views, socioeconomic information, societal values, and spatially demarcated areas, according to local jurisdiction and traditions. Indeed, the most promising avenue toward resolving the present marine fishery crises (Defeo and Castilla, 2005) is not only to consider that marine fisheries deal with common-pool resources, in which fishing is a privilege rather than a right, but the implementation of sea-zoning-linked management (see, e.g., Young et al., 2007; Douvere and Ehler, 2008) and the allocation of fishery rights: granted in exclusivity, leased, or sold to users (Castilla and Defeo, 2001; Hannenson, 2005). These strategies focus mainly on the development of mechanisms and incentives to operate fishery systems in socially acceptable ways (Hilborn et al., 2005; McClanahan et al., 2009). Moreover, fishery management and sustainability MOTE SYMPOSIUM INVITED PAPER BULLETIN OF MARINE SCIENCE, VOL. 86, NO. 2, 2010 222 will always rely heavily on the ability to determine the biological surplus production of fished populations and on the correct administration of fishing effort. In my view, unless socially accepted and sound biological and/or local ecological knowledge crystallize in established fishery legislation, or traditions, the so-called “race for fish” will continue. Robert E. Johannes pioneered these issues (Johannes, 1978, 1998a, 2002; Johannes et al., 2000). The present article honors his work and wisdom. Bob taught us that sea tenure and self-governance values were deeply rooted in societies embedded in a “sea-going culture” and that they were expressed as natural individual, societal, and cultural attitudes. He strongly argued that implementation of this kind of sustainable fishery management approach, even in data-poor fishery situations (Johannes, 1998b), was much needed around the world. In general, these attitudes are not recognized or respected in societies where a “sea-going culture” no longer exists or where behavior is rewarded that favors short-term rather than long-term fishery benefits. I believe that, in Chile, among other countries, we have confronted Bob’s challenges and discovered progress along the path he signaled can be made (see Gelcich et al., 2009). The establishment of inner-inshore territorial use rights for fisheries, which take the form of management and exploitation areas for benthic resources, and the development of comanagement tools for artisan fisher communities are important examples for resources that show limited mobility (Castilla, 1994; Bernal et al., 1999; Castilla and Defeo, 2001). Undoubtedly, a more complex fishery-management task is to implement similar tools for highly mobile species, as in pelagic fisheries and among artisan and industrial fishers. The present article highlights some of the Chilean fishery policies for small pelagic species linked to the reallocation of rights to fish, sea zoning, and the division of fishery quotas between the artisan and industrial subsectors, rooted in the 1991 Fishery and Aquaculture Law. Within these fisheries, I report historical trade-offs for purse-seine vessel holding capacities, landings, and fishery values, and I highlight the implementation of promising comprehensive management and empowerment strategies for confronting the “race for fish.” Chilean Fisheries: Regulation, Zoning, Management, and Purse-Seiner Landings Artisan and Industrial Fishery Regulations.—Since the early 1990s new fishery legislation has been passed in Chile. Here I summarize main regulations in the 1991 Chilean Fishery and Aquaculture Law (FAL, Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura N°18,892, DS N°439, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Reconstrucción, Subsecretaria de Pesca, Valparaíso, Chile), which included conservation, sea zoning, reallocation of the right to fish for the artisan and industrial fleets, and new management schemes. The FAL decreed two fishery fleet units: The first, the artisan fleet, is heterogeneous, ranging from deckless boats (V-shaped hulls without decks), usually less than 8–10 m in length, with or without outboard engines, to small and mid-size vessels (“lanchas”), with a maximum length of 18 m and 50 gross tons. An artisan fisher is defined as an individual who works on the sea as a crew member and/or owns a boat/vessel, or has a maximum of two boats/vessels, which jointly do not exceed 50 gross tons. The second unit, the industrial fleet, includes vessels above 50 gross tons. Industrial vessels are registered by owners, and every year the vessel must pay a fixed fee (“patente”), in addition to holding a license. For each major fishery, the number CASTILLA: SMALL-PELAGIC FISHERY, CHILE 223 of licenses is limited, because they have been under a limited-entry system for about 20 yrs. In fact, before the 1991 FAL was passed, major Chilean fisheries, including those for small pelagic species, were administratively closed to new entries. The FAL decreed these fisheries to be “fully exploited fisheries,” and new entries remained closed. A valid license can expire if the vessel does not demonstrate it has operated during the last year or if it has not paid the “patente.” For the industrial fleet the “right to fish” is part of the economic value of the vessel. For the artisan subsector, FAL bestowed fishing rights on individuals, so when an artisan boat is sold, the fishing rights disappear unless the buyer is a registered artisan fisher. The FAL has created incentives for the entry of new artisan operators, particularly in the traditional purse-seine fleet. Artisan and industrial fleets are ascribed to separate Fishery Registers. Since 2000, each industrial and artisan (“lancha”) vessel must be equipped with a vessel monitoring system (VMS). Sea Zoning, Territorial Exclusive Zones, and Fishing Rights.—The FAL imposes three major sea-zoning schemes along the Chilean maritime territory. The first is the artisan exclusive zone (AEZ), a zone of 9.3 km (5 nautical miles) wide (water column and sea bottom) determined by coastal base lines, which extends about 2500 km along the coast and covers about 27,000–30,000 km2, facing continental Chile between 18°21́ W and 41°28 ́S. (Fig. 1) and Chilean oceanic islands. The AEZ can be seen as a fishing empowerment for the Chilean artisan fishery community (subsistence, small, and mid-scale fisheries), resulting in a reallocation of the right to fish between artisan and industry operators over an important portion of the sea. Although the AEZ was not demarcated on the basis of scientific or fishery-management criteria, but was a product of political transactions, in my view it has played an important fishery-management role in the country. In fact, the AEZ approximately coincides in width with the narrow Chilean continental platform, the mean width of which is 4.8–6.4 km in northern Chile and about 16 km in central-southern Chile, where upwelling is persistent and small pelagic species tend to concentrate (Bernal et al., 1982; Martínez et al., 1987). The industrial fleet cannot operate inside the AEZ (although regulations provide for the possibility in special cases); but the artisan fleet can operate beyond the AEZ border. Artisan fishers must be registered in one of the administrative regions of Chile, and their fishery activities are legally restricted within that space, although special permits can be procured to fish in an adjacent region. Fishing is not spatially restricted for either fleet south of 41°28 ́S (Fig. 1). The second, and best known, spatial management regulation implemented in the 1991 FAL is territorial use rights for fisheries (TURFs). Within the AEZ, farther south, and around oceanic islands (Fig. 1), the law allocated extra exclusive fishing rights to subsistence and small-scale artisan communities (mostly divers operating from V-hull deckless boats) in the form of shallow inner-inshore management and exploitation areas for benthic resources (AMERBs, an acronym for their Spanish name), under a comanagement scheme (Fig. 1; see also Castilla, 1994, 1997; Castilla et al., 1998; Bernal et al., 1999; Castilla and Defeo, 2001). Currently 707 AMERBs have been approved along the Chilean coast, each having 1–4 km2 and covering about 1100 km2 (Gelcich et al., 2008a; SERNAPESCA, 2009). The third form of spatial management regulation is marine reserves and parks. The FAL includes restrictive fishery zones intended to protect resource reproductive BULLETIN OF MARINE SCIENCE, VOL. 86, NO. 2, 2010 224 stocks (genetic reserves), areas for restocking, and marine parks that preserve ecological units of scientific interest. Total Allowable Catch and Quota Regimes.—The FAL established different fishery-management regimes according to the degree of species exploitation. For fully exploited species, vessels must be registered for specific fisheries, and management is based on total allowable catches, determined by the government, on the basis of stock assessments and quota allocations to individuals (artisans) and registered (industrial) vessels. The Chilean ITQ system has been subjected to key ad hoc restrictions (Peña-Torre, 1997; Gómez-Lobo et al., 2007), and it cannot be aligned with the traditional concept of fully marketable ITQs. Every year, for fully exploited species, 5% of the total allowable catch can be openly leased by the government. Quota Figure 1. Map of Chile (not to scale) showing the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and zones reserved for exclusive fishery access by the artisan fleet, as decreed in the 1991 Chilean Fishery and Aquaculture Law. The 9.3-km (5 nautical mile) artisan exclusive fishery zone (AEZ, for all resources) between 18°21́ W and 41°28 ́S, covers about 27,000 km. Inner-inshore management and exploitation areas for benthic resources (AMERBs, shown schematically as black points) provide exclusive fishery rights over benthic species for artisan-organized communities. CASTILLA: SMALL-PELAGIC FISHERY, CHILE 225 transference in the industrial fishery subsector can be made only on the basis of fleet merging. Quota allocations are further based on consultations and recommendations by five macroregional fishery bodies, with the participation of local authorities, artisan and industrial representation, and academics, linked to a national fishery council. This process is subject to powerful lobbying from artisan and industrialfishing interest groups (Peña-Torre, 1997). In 2001 a new management regulation for the pelagic fishery (Law N°19.731, 2001) was passed to regulate the maximum catch per vessel owner (“Límite Máximo de Captura por Armador”). Notably, this regulation was preceded by the implementation, during 1997–2000, of a “pseudoquota system” based on 47 “fishing research/experimental expeditions” (Gómez-Lobo et al., 2007). Landings, Purse-Seine Vessel Holding Capacities, and Resource Values.— Fishery landings reported here were taken from national reports published by the Servicio Nacional de Pesca (SERNAPESCA, 1970–2006), Subsecretary of Fishery, Minister of Economy, Chile. The number of artisan and industrial seine vessels and their holding capacity (VHC) per region were obtained from the Departamento Sistemas de Información y Estadística Pesquera (SIEP), SERNAPESCA, Chile. Published official information is scarce regarding long-term statistics on fleet size, artisan spatial capture inside or outside the AEZ, fishing effort due to artisan or industrial purse-seine fleets (i.e., number of trips, number of effective fishing hours, and capture per unit effort), and sets of long-term data for quota allocations to fleets or individuals. Therefore, on the basis of available information, the work reported here focused mainly on historical landing (1970–2006) and the purse-seine fishery for the five most important small pelagic species: Pacific jack mackerel, Trachurus symmetricus (Ayres, 1855) (“jurel”); anchoveta, Engraulis ringens Jenyns, 1942 (“anchoveta”); South American pilchard, Sardinops sagax (Jenyns, 1842) (“sardina española”); Araucanian herring, Strangomera bentincki (Norman, 1936) (“sardina común”); and chub mackerel, Scomber japonicus Houttuyn, 1782 (“caballa”), in the two most productive fishing areas of Chile: (a) regions I and II in northern Chile and (b) region VIII in south central Chile. In 2006 these areas accounted for 71% of total small pelagic species landed in Chile. The first three species listed were declared fully exploited in 1993–1994 and the Chilean herring in 2000. Export values for Chilean fisheries were obtained from the Banco Central de Chile.