Supermodular Games

نویسنده

  • Jonathan Levin
چکیده

These notes develop the theory of supermodular games. Supermodular games are those characterized by “strategic complementarities” – roughly, this means that when one player takes a higher action, the others want to do the same. Supermodular games are interesting for several reasons. First, they encompass many applied models. Second, they have the remarkable property that many solution concepts yield the same predictions. Finally, they tend to be analytically appealing – they have nice comparative statics properties and behave well under various learning rules. Much of the theory is due to Topkis (1979), Vives (1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990).

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تاریخ انتشار 2003