Delineating the Moral Domain

Moral psychology and naturalistic moral philosophers should strive to understand howmoral and non-moral norms differ. Using Patricia Churchland’s recent book Braintrust as an example, I describe the pitfalls of failing to take this issue seriously, and I introduce a new research program about the delineation of the moral domain. Which norms and normative judgments belong to the moral domain, and which do not? In recent years, moral philosophers (ethicists as well as meta-ethicists) and moral psychologists have largely overlooked this question (for two exceptions, see Gert 2011 and Haidt 2012). Philosophers’ and psychologists’ lack of attention to this question is puzzling since many important debates in moral philosophy and moral psychology depend on how the moral domain is characterized (Machery and Stich, forthcoming). In this brief article, I will show that failing to clarify the distinction between moral and non-moral norms can lead one’s theorizing about moral psychology astray, and I will describe the outlines of a research program about the delineation of the moral domain. To fulfill these goals, I will use Patricia Churchland’s recent book on moral psychology, Braintrust, as a springboard, arguing that this otherwise fine book fails to cast much light on moral psychology because it never attempts seriously to delineate the moral domain. Here is how I will proceed. In Section 1, I will briefly review Braintrust before discussing in Section 2 the arguments advanced by Churchland Delineating the Moral Domain 2 to justify her refusal to delineate the moral domain in any detail. In Section 3, I will look at psychologist Elliot Turiel’s well-known attempt to delineate the moral domain, and I will discuss the recent research casting doubts on this attempt. Finally, in Section 4, I will describe the outlines of a research program meant to delineate the moral domain.