Non-Cooperation Game for Aircraft Pushback Slot Allocation Based on Dynamic Credibility Priority

Aircraft pushback management can make departure aircraft wait at the gate with engines off instead of waiting in queue before the runway with engines on, thus can reduce the fuel consumption. However, that can also cause delay the take-off time, which in turn reduces the capacity and passenger satisfaction. In view of this, this paper builds an non-cooperation game model for aircraft pushback slot allocation by considering the take-off time and fuel consumption, in which the delay and fuel utility of aircraft pushback management is quantified with modern game theory. The object function is the maximum delay and fuel utility of the system, the allocation strategy is first come first service (FCFS) and dynamic credibility priority, which the punishment of default is in consideration, then the hybrid decision algorithm based on dynamic credibility priority (HEAR) is proposed. Numerical results with real data of Xinzheng international airport demonstrate that the application of game theory can reflect the utility of participant, and HEAR provides better performance than FCFS, it can reduce the fuel consumption and the delay of departure aircraft. Keywordsnon-cooperation game; dynamic credibility priority; aircraft pushback; slot allocation; hybrid decision algorithm