Syria’s Support of Iran in the Gulf War: The Role of Structural Change and the Emergence of a Relatively Strong State BY ELIE CHALALA

Syria’s support of Iran in the Gulf War needs explanation, surprising as it has both Arabs and non-Arabs. That Syrian policy is not self-explanatory can be attributed to pre-existing expectations about inter-Arab relations, whereby Arab states would stand by each other whenever challenged by foreign powers, even if those powers happened to be Islamic states. Demonstrating Arab solidarity becomes even more urgent when Israel, considered enemy by most Arab countries, is in an informal alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran – this has manifested itself in military sales and assistance provided by Israel to the Khomeini regime. These pre-existing expectations are derived from the ideology of pan-Arabism, an ideology which influences a number of students of Arab foreign policy. Another factor, besides pan-Arab solidarity, which presents problems in explaining Syria’s role in the Gulf War, lies in the popularized notion that the Arab Gulf states are fully supportive of Iraq’s war efforts, and thus it is counterproductive for Syria to adopt a policy contrary to their interests, given the generous and continuing economic aid it has been receiving from them since 1970. This expectation is derived from the assumption that Syria is a rentier state whose economy depends on subsidies from the Gulf states. These expectations and a priori theories account for the difficulties of explaining Syria’s Gulf policy. It is neither the first nor will it be the last time that some of us will discover a given foreign policy decision to be inconsistent with prior expectations, and a priori theory to be disconfirmed by credible evidence. These disappointments often contribute to rethinking assumptions, propositions, and general theories. In this paper,