Three variations on the analysis of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol with MGS
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چکیده
In this paper, we develop an analysis of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol (NSPK) using a P system approach. This analysis is used to validate the protocol and exhibits, as expected, a well known logical attack. The novelty of our approach is to use MGS, a P system like formalism, to find the attack by a systematic state exploration. The use of multiset rewriting has already been advocated for the development of protocol validation tools. In this work, we focus on the use of nested multisets (i.e. membranes). The use of membranes enables to tight the conditions for detecting an attack. All the three proposed version of the analysis have been successfully implemented in MGS and we conclude the paper by a discussion on how the MGS programs can be translated into standard P systems. 1 Goal and Motivations Since the 1994 landmark demonstration by Adleman of the possibilities of DNA to solve a class of combinatorial problems, biocomputing has often be advocated to develop “chemically combinatorial problem solvers”. In this paper, we want to use the computational model of P system to address a well known combinatorial problem: the analysis of a cryptographic protocol. ∗Corresponding author : LaMI umr 8042 CNRS – Université d’Évry, Tour Évry-2, 523 place des terrasses de l’agora, 91000 France. Email: [email protected] †LSV, CNRS UMR 8643 – ENS de Cachan, 61 avenue du Président Wilson, 94235 CACHAN Cedex, France. Email: [email protected] ‡LaMI umr 8042 CNRS – Université d’Évry, Tour Évry-2, 523 place des terrasses de l’agora, 91000 France. Email: [email protected]
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تاریخ انتشار 2004