Never let me clone?

In the March 2006 issue of EMBO reports, Christof Tannert, a bioethicist at the Max Delbrück Research Centre in Berlin, Germany, presented a moral argument against human reproductive cloning on the basis of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative (Tannert, 2006). In this article, I address some problems with Tannert’s views and show that our concerns about this prospective procedure should prompt us to scrutinize carefully the conventional procreative practices and attitudes. Indeed, if we set aside objections that are grounded in genetic determinism, many of the offensive features of human cloning are identical to problems with procreation by more conventional means, including both old-fashioned procreation and assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). Oddly enough, many see only cloning as problematic, whereas identical problems with everyday procreation continue to go unnoticed. In his article, Tannert endeavours to provide us with a sound argument that human reproductive cloning “violates our basic moral principles”. He grounds his argument in Immanuel Kant’s central moral principle of respect for all humanity, which the great philosopher formulated as: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never as a means only” (Kant, 1785). In essence, Kant’s principle prohibits using rational creatures— humans—as mere instruments to attain one’s own selfish goals. Tannert claims that human reproductive cloning—through somatic cell nuclear transfer or embryo splitting—is immoral because it violates this principle by using a human—the clone—for egoistical purposes. However, as I demonstrate, this assertion is problematic. Although treating people created by cloning as mere means—for example, as organ banks—would be morally unacceptable, it is misleading to identify cloning itself as the core problem. Furthermore, although Kant’s respect for humanity is of great practical value, it does not provide us with adequate guidance with regard to cloning. His moral principle clearly applies to existing people, but it falls short in helping us to determine whether a particular means of creating people is morally permissible. As Deborah Johnson explained in another context, often “moral concepts and principles are ambiguous in their application to new technology” (Johnson, 2005). If we ever hope to figure out why the prospect of human cloning, especially reproductive cloning, is so unsettling, we must first remove any marginal problems that infiltrate the arguments in this debate, including Tannert’s. First, despite his explicit rejection of genetic determinism, Tannert ends up appealing to it. Second, he assumes that only selfishness and egoism could motivate someone to pursue reproductive cloning. Third, he makes the assumption that a cloned person would inevitably be treated as a mere means. Fourth, his appeal to Kant’s moral principle fails to clarify where the line should be drawn with respect to research cloning.