Pii: S1053-8100(02)00016-8

Perceptual experience seems to involve distinct intentional and qualitative features. Inasmuch as one can visually perceive that there is a Coke can in front of one, perceptual experience must be intentional. But such experiences seem to differ from paradigmatic intentional states in having introspectible qualitative character. Peacocke (1983) argues that a perceptual experience s qualitative character is determined by intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties. But Peacocke (2001, 1992) also argues that perceptual experiences have nonconceptual representational content in addition to conceptual content and nonrepresentational sensational properties. He thus distinguishes between conceptual, nonrepresentational, and nonconceptual but representational aspects of perceptual experience. I will argue that Peacocke posits too much. Contrary to his (1983) arguments, the sensational properties Peacocke claims are nonrepresentational are best construed as representational; they are best explained in terms of their relation to the perceptible properties they enable us to perceive. Since sensational properties are arguably nonconceptual, they are best construed as nonconceptual representational properties. I offer the Homomorphism View of sensory qualities, pioneered by Sellars (1956), as a unified account of qualitative character and nonconceptual sensory representation. According to this view, a sensory quality represents a perceptible stimulus property in virtue of resembling and differing from other sensory qualities in ways parallel to the ways the stimulus property resembles and differs from other perceptible properties. 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2002) 630–641 www.academicpress.com Consciousness and Cognition E-mail address: [email protected]. 1053-8100/02/$ see front matter 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. PII: S1053-8100(02)00016-8