Information revelation in auctions

Speeding Up Ascending-Bid Auctions

In recent years auctions have grown in interest within the AI community as innovative mechanisms for resource allocation. The primary contribution of this paper is to identify a family of hybrid auctions, called survival auctions, which combine the benefits of both sealed-bid auctions (namely, quick and predictable termination time) and ascendingbid auctions (namely, more information revelation...

Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions

Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions

The Vickrey auction has been widely advocated for multiagent systems. First we review its limitations so as to guide practitioners in their decision of when to use that protocol. These limitations include lower revenue than alternative protocols, lying in non-private-value auctions, bidder collusion, a lying auctioneer, and undesirable revelation of sensitive information. We discuss the special...

Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect∗

We study auctions with endogenous outside options determined through actions taken in the aftermarket. We show that endogenous outside options have important consequences for auction design. In contrast to the case of exogenous outside options, auctions with less information revelation may yield higher revenues. Opaque auctions decrease the information available to losing bidders, which leads t...

Preference Revelation in Multi-Attribute Reverse English Auctions: A Laboratory Study

The effects of preference revelation on allocational and Pareto efficiency are studied in a multi-attribute reverse English auction. Multi-attribute reverse auctions have been proposed as market institutions for electronic request for quotation buying processes. Preference revelation is a crucial question in multi-attribute reverse auctions in terms of the efficiency of auction outcomes. Result...