In the right direction but slightly off course.

Richard E. Redding (March 2001) is to be complimented for calling attention to the incongruity between the narrowness of psychology’s liberal sociopolitical mentality and its simultaneous reverence for cultural diversity. His justified criticism, however, failed to come to grips with the moral and methodological issues underlying his complaint. Is his objection solely directed at the restricted liberal sociopolitical orientation that is dominant among psychologists and the American Psychological Association (APA), or is the problem more basic than Redding admitted? One can suggest that if all sociopolitical views in the United States were proportionally represented in the APA, its responsibilities to a democratic society and to scientific standards would not automatically be achieved. Redding (2001) alerted readers to the fact that the “pervasive liberal zeitgeist” (p. 210) in psychology discourages investigating important variables in social policy research (e.g., the importance of male role models in lesbian parenting). More importantly, he failed to pursue the implications of methodological principles he acknowledged: the importance of “[separating] science from advocacy” (Redding, 2001, p. 211) and the fact that “psychology can neither validate nor invalidate moral beliefs” (Redding, 2001, p. 212). Redding’s basic methodological confusion is reflected in his expressed reservation about his own attack on the liberal bias that pervades psychology. “It is possible, of course, that psychology’s tenets may be overwhelmingly liberal yet accurate. In other words, the liberal worldview may be the correct one” (Redding, 2001, p. 208). How could such a hypothesis be substantiated? Although aware of the fact–value dichotomy, the failure of is to logically generate ought, Redding (2001) failed to perceive its implications for his general complaint. If moral principles or social policies cannot be validated by psychological evidence, what justification has professional psychology to identify moral principles or social policies that are right for society? Democracy emerges from the recognition and acceptance of moral pluralism, the realization that every moral principle and social policy will generate dissent and opposition. “The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is . . . an inescapable characteristic of the human condition” (Berlin, 1958, p. 54). Rather than seek to identify the morally correct social policy, psychology can, in a nonpareil fashion, serve the needs of a democracy by providing reliable scientific information about the consequences of controversial social policies: affirmative action with preferential treatment, prolife abortion policies, bilingual education, genetic influences in behavioral difference between genders and in those exhibited by different breeding populations, and so on. Although such evidence cannot directly justify or validate a particular social policy, it can provide society with reliable information that will assist a democracy in making a choice between absolute claims. Although I do not minimize the difficulty of psychology serving in this educational capacity, it can fulfill this important responsibility by adhering to natural science standards that have been so successful in physics, chemistry, and biology (Kendler, 1999, 2000a). Such a success will depend on psychology disabusing itself of the notion that it can dictate what is good and bad and what is right and wrong. Philip Handler (1980), when president of the National Academy of Sciences, warned that “scientists best serve public policy by living within the ethics of science, not those of politics” (p. 1093). My disagreement with Redding (2001) should not hide our shared reservation about psychology as a science and profession actively seeking political goals. Our position does not deprive the rights of individual psychologists to engage in political activities as long as they do not imply that, as psychologists, they can identify moral imperative or that their position is supported by all psychologists. I have said it once, and I must say it again: