An Adaptive Sponsored Search Mechanism δ-Gain Truthful in Valuation, Time, and Budget

نویسندگان

  • Rica Gonen
  • Elan Pavlov
چکیده

This paper presents an online sponsored search auc-tion that motivates advertisers to report their true budget, arrival time, departure time, and value per click.The auction is based on a modified Multi-Armed Ban-dit (MAB) mechanism that allows for advertisers whoarrive and depart in an online fashion, have a value perclick, and are budget constrained.In tackling the problem of truthful budget, arrivaland departure times, it turns out that it is not possi-ble to achieve truthfulness in the classical sense (whichwe show in a companion paper). As such, we definea new concept called δ-gain. δ-gain bounds the util-ity a player can gain by lying as opposed to his utilitywhen telling the truth. Building on the δ-gain conceptwe define another new concept called relative 2-gain,which bounds the relative ratio of the gain a player canachieve by lying with respect to his true utility. Weargue that for many practical applications if the δ-gainand or the relative 2-gain are small, then players willnot invest time and effort in making strategic choicesbut will truthtell as a default strategy. These conceptscapture the essence of dominant strategy mechanismsas they lead the advertiser to choose truthtelling overother strategies.In order to achieve δ-gain truthful mechanism this paper also presents a new payment scheme, Time se-ries Truthful Payment Scheme (TTPS), for an onlinebudget-constrained auction mechanism. The paymentscheme is a generalization of the VCG principles for anonline scheduling environment with budgeted players.Using the concepts of δ-gain truthful we presentthe only known budget-constrained sponsored searchauction with truthful guarantees on budget, arrivals,departures, and valuations. Previous works that deal ∗Yahoo! Research Labs, 701 First Street, Sunnyvale, CA 94089. Email: [email protected] We are submitting this paper for confidential review, all rights reserved†E15-313 Media Lab, MIT, Cambridge MA, 02149. Email: [email protected] advertiser budgets only deal with the non-strategiccase.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Characterizing Optimal Syndicated Sponsored Search Market Design

The analysis to date of sponsored search auctions, originally conducted by Varian and independently by Aggarwal et al., has yet to describe more recent developments such as the emergence of interacting advertising exchanges. This paper assess the significance of such phenomena. Building on Gonen and Vassilvitskii’s model of sponsored search with reserve prices we depict advertising networks as ...

متن کامل

A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling

We consider the Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem, where advertisers must be scheduled to sponsored search slots during a given period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constraint, as well as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search. We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subjec...

متن کامل

Sponsored Search Auctions with Reserve Prices: Going Beyond Separability

The original analysis of sponsored search auctions by Varian and independently by Aggarwal et al. did not take into account the notion of reserve prices, which are common across all major search engines. We investigate this further and show that the separability assumption derived by Aggarwal et al. is not sufficient for aligning the greedy allocation employed by GSP and the efficient allocatio...

متن کامل

On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives

We study a class of procurement auctions with a budget constraint, where an auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents. Ideally, the auctioneer would like to select a subset of the resources so as to maximize his valuation function, without exceeding a given budget. As the resources are owned by strategic agents however, our overall goal is to design mechanism...

متن کامل

Sort-Cut: A Pareto Optimal and Semi-Truthful Mechanism for Multi-Unit Auctions with Budget-Constrained Bidders

Motivated by sponsored search auctions with hard budget constraints given by the advertisers, we study multi-unit auctions of a single item. An important example is a sponsored result slot for a keyword, with many units representing its inventory in a month, say. In this single-item multi-unit auction, each bidder has a private value for each unit, and a private budget which is the total amount...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2007