Truth in the Emendation

More than two-thirds of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect is about truth. Spinoza explains why true ideas are preferable (TIE §§18–29), how to begin forming true ideas (TIE §§30–48), and how to distinguish true ideas from other kinds of ideas (TIE §§50–90). Spinoza’s account of truth is therefore our key to the Emendation. It would thus be disheartening if Ed Curley were right that the text is “too mysterious” to interpret Spinoza’s account of truth with any confidence.1 Despite Curley’s skepticism, I will propose a new interpretation. I’ll start by listing seven of the features of true ideas that Spinoza mentions in the Emendation. I’ll then argue that the three leading interpretations fail to explain why Spinoza mentions these features. In particular, I will criticize the correspondence interpretation (that it is definitive of true ideas to correspond to what they represent), the coherence interpretation (that it is definitive of true ideas that they cohere with other ideas in the mind), and the causal interpretation (that it is definitive of true ideas that they are not caused by something outside the mind). I’ll then propose a new interpretation. Stated roughly, my proposal is that it is definitive of true ideas that they represent essences and are derived in the right kind of way by the intellect from an innate idea of one’s own essence. I will call this the “essentric interpretation,” because of the central role of essences. I will end by sketching why I believe this is also the best interpretation of the Ethics. Given that Spinoza’s account of truth is at the foundation of the Emendation, it is natural to wonder why he doesn’t explicitly define it. There are at least two