Compliance Strategies under Permits for Emissions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Ravi Subramanian • Sudheer Gupta • Brian Talbot College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, 800 West Peachtree Street NW, Atlanta, Georgia 30332, USA Faculty of Business Administration, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6, Canada Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, 701 Tappan Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109, USA [email protected] • [email protected] • [email protected]
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تاریخ انتشار 2008