On strategy-proof social choice under categorization
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper, I consider the social choice problems such that (i) the set of alternatives can be categorized into two groups based on some prominent and objective feature and (ii) the agents have strict preferences over the candidates. I introduce a notion of linear dichotomous domains to describe a class of plausible preference profiles in these social choice problems. My main result is a characterization of the form of all strategy-proof social choice functions on any linear dichotomous domain.
منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 38 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012