A Many - to - Many “ Rural Hospital Theorem ” Flip Klijn
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that the full version of the so-called ‘rural hospital theorem’ generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We also show that when agents’ preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of weakly separable pref-
منابع مشابه
A Many-to-Many ‘Rural Hospital Theorem’
We show that the full version of the so-called ‘rural hospital theorem’ (Roth, 1986) generalizes to many-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market have separable and substitutable preferences.
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