Auctions and Negotiations are Comparable , Aren ’ t They ?

نویسندگان

  • Gregory E. Kersten
  • Margaret Kersten
چکیده

Comparative studies of auction and negotiation exchange mechanisms are inconclusive. These studies have typically compared outcomes obtained from the two mechanisms. The question which this paper aims to address is the viability of outcome-based comparisons. Such comparisons assume that both mechanisms produce the same types of outcomes but their values differ. An argument can be made that this is not necessarily the case. Based on several experiments of multi-attribute auctions and two formats of multi-bilateral negotiations the paper argues that both mechanisms produce some outcomes which are the same but other outcomes which are qualitatively different.

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تاریخ انتشار 2013