Law, Agency Costs and Project Finance
نویسندگان
چکیده
We investigate Project Finance as a private response to ine¢ ciencies created by weak legal protection of outside investors. In the context of large investment projects, Project Finance o¤ers a contractual and organizational substitute for investor protection laws by making cash ows veri able, thereby enhancing debt capacity. Project Finance makes cash ows veri able through: (i) contractual arrangements made possible by structuring the Project Company as a single, discrete project legally separate from the sponsor; and (ii) private enforcement of these contracts through a network of project accounts that ensures lender control of project cash ows. Comparing the incidence of bank loans for Project Finance with regular corporate loans for large investments (Corporate Debt Finance), we show that Project Finance is more likely in countries with weaker laws against insider stealing and weaker creditor rights laws. In addition, stronger creditor rights mitigate the marginal e¤ect of weaker laws against insider stealing on the choice of Project Finance versus Corporate Debt Finance. To provide this evidence, we employ cross-country tests as well as time-series, di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests that exploit country-level changes in legal rules. JEL classi cation: G32, G33, G34, K22
منابع مشابه
Investigating the Effect of Financial Constraints and Different Levels of Agency Cost on Investment Efficiency
This research attempts to investigate the effect of financial constraints and different levels of agency costs on the investment efficiency of companies in Iran. Following the design of the financial risk assessment indexes, the transaction information was collected from the Stock Exchange in the five-year period of 2011-2015. The statistical sample consists of 128 companies selected by samplin...
متن کاملThe determinants of capital structure across firms’ sizes: The U.K evidence
This paper explores the leverage determinants across firms’ sizesbased on the two main theories behind the capital structure, the trade-offand the pecking order theories. A panel data is sued to find therelationship between capital structure and the variables that proxy forbenefits and costs of debt during 1990 to 2006. Our findings show thatboth principles help to explain the capital structure...
متن کاملThe Mediating Effect of Information Asymmetry and Agency Costs on the Relationship Between CSR and Investment Efficiency
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the relationship between corporate social responsibility and investment efficiency with particular emphasis on the mediating role of agency cost and information asymmetry in a sample of 121 firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the time period from 2012 to 2017. The research hypotheses are tested using multivariate regression analysi...
متن کاملRisk allocation and the costs and benefits of publicprivate partnerships
We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between effort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may arise during operations. Our analysis highlights the costs and benefits that bundling pl...
متن کاملAgency Cost of Debt and Credit Market Competition: a Bargaining Approach
This paper studies the effect of credit market competition, measured by the bargaining power of banks, on the agency costs of debt finance. The threshold of obtaining loan finance is shown to be independent of the relative bargaining power of the financier, while intensified credit market competition leads to lower lending rates and investment return distributions with lower, but less risky ret...
متن کامل