FS IV 02 – 27 Incomplete Risk Adjustment and Adverse Selection in the German Public Health Insurance System
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چکیده
Incomplete Risk Adjustment and Adverse Selection in the German Public Health Insurance System by Thomas Knaus and Robert Nuscheler The German statutory health insurance market was exposed to competition in 1996. To avoid adverse selection, a prospective risk compensation scheme was introduced in 1994. Due to their low contribution rates, company-based sickness funds were able to attract a lot of new members. We analyze – using data from the German SocioEconomic Panel – the determinants of these transitions from 1995 to 2000. By estimating a simultaneous two equation system, we find that health status positively, and significantly, affects the probability of changing to a company-based sickness fund, especially after controlling for age. Thus the risk compensation scheme does not fully control for the health status of the changers. Consequently, the comparative advantages of company-based funds will increase over time. This observation provides evidence for the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium.
منابع مشابه
Risk selection in the German public health insurance system.
The German statutory health insurance market was exposed to competition in 1996. To limit direct risk selection the regulator required open enrollment. As the risk compensation scheme, introduced in 1994, is highly incomplete, substantial incentives for risk selection exist. Due to their low premiums, company-based sickness funds have been able to attract a lot of new members. We analyze, using...
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