Fast to Forgive, Slow to Retaliate: Intuitive Responses in the Ultimatum Game Depend on the Degree of Unfairness
نویسندگان
چکیده
Evolutionary accounts have difficulty explaining why people cooperate with anonymous strangers they will never meet. Recently models, focusing on emotional processing, have been proposed as a potential explanation, with attention focusing on a dual systems approach based on system 1 (fast, intuitive, automatic, effortless, and emotional) and system 2 (slow, reflective, effortful, proactive and unemotional). Evidence shows that when cooperation is salient, people are fast (system 1) to cooperate, but with longer delays (system 2) they show greed. This is interpreted within the framework of the social heuristic hypothesis (SHH), whereby people overgeneralize potentially advantageous intuitively learnt and internalization social norms to 'atypical' situations. We extend this to explore intuitive reactions to unfairness by integrating the SHH with the 'fast to forgive, slow to anger' (FFSA) heuristic. This suggests that it is advantageous to be prosocial when facing uncertainty. We propose that whether or not someone intuitively shows prosociality (cooperation) or retaliation is moderated by the degree (certainty) of unfairness. People should intuitively cooperate when facing mild levels of unfairness (fast to forgive) but when given longer to decide about another's mild level of unfairness should retaliate (slow to anger). However, when facing severe levels of unfairness, the intuitive response is always retaliation. We test this using a series of one-shot ultimatum games and manipulate level of offer unfairness (50:50 60:40, 70:30, 80:20, 90:10) and enforced time delays prior to responding (1s, 2s, 8s, 15s). We also measure decision times to make responses after the time delays. The results show that when facing mildly unfair offers (60:40) people are fast (intuitive) to cooperate but with longer delays reject these mildly unfair offers: 'fast to forgive, and slow to retaliate'. However, for severely unfair offers (90:10) the intuitive and fast response is to always reject.
منابع مشابه
“An Eye for an Eye”? Neural Correlates of Retribution and Forgiveness
Humans have evolved strong preferences for equity and fairness. Neuroimaging studies suggest that punishing unfairness is associated with the activation of a neural network comprising the anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula, the ventral striatum, and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Here, we report the neuronal correlates of retribution and "forgiveness" in a scenario, in whic...
متن کاملNeural responses to unfairness and fairness depend on self-contribution to the income.
Self-contribution to the income (individual achievement) was an important factor which needs to be taken into individual's fairness considerations. This study aimed at elucidating the modulation of self-contribution to the income, on recipient's responses to unfairness in the Ultimatum Game. Eighteen participants were scanned while they were playing an adapted version of the Ultimatum Game as r...
متن کاملIncreased neural responses to unfairness in a loss context
Unfairness plays an important role in economic decision making. This fMRI study sought to investigate how the loss and the gain contexts could modulate behavioral and brain responses to unfairness by focusing on participants' rejection behaviors during an Ultimatum Game paradigm. Participants were scanned while they were playing the Ultimatum Game as responders in both loss and gain contexts, i...
متن کاملNeural correlates of decision making after unfair treatment
Empirical evidence indicates that people are inequity averse. However, it is unclear whether and how suffering unfairness impacts subsequent behavior. We investigated the consequences of unfair treatment in subsequent interactions with new interaction partners and the associated neural mechanisms. Participants were experimentally manipulated to experience fair or unfair treatment in the ultimat...
متن کاملThe Covered Response Ultimatum Game
We report an experiment on the covered response ultimatum game, in which the proposer is not informed about the responder’s reaction to an unequal offer. In this game, no education of proposers is possible. A control experiment with informed proposers was also conducted. We observe high rejection rates with covered response. These are explained by responders’ resistance to unfairness. But the r...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره 9 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014