Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance
نویسنده
چکیده
The subject of government bank regulation is intimately intertwined with that of government deposit insurance. If the government is to insure bank deposits, it should also have some say in the risks that insured banks are allowed to take, otherwise it would leave itself wide open to unlimited potential losses. John H. Kareken (in this issue) comes close to arguing that banks without government deposit insurance could provide satisfactorily safe transactions accounts. I would go one step further and argue that government deposit insurance is not just unnecessary but actually undesirable. Banks that offer transaction deposits are supposedly subject to an "inherent instability problem" that makes them prone to self-realizing depositor panics. Traditionally, transaction deposits are denominated as a fixed number of currency units, while the assets corresponding to these deposits are mostly finite-term securities or commercial loans. If depositors all want their money at once, the banks simply do not have it. To the extent that their assets are marketable, the banks can sell them off to meet withdrawals with only minimal losses. But if there is a run on the banking system as a whole, the banks' scramble for funds could conceivably drive interest rates up and asset prices down to the point at which the banks are actually insolvent simply because of depositor fears that they might fail. To the extent that bank assets consist of poorly marketable commercial loans, they are even more exposed to the risk of runs. This inherent instability problem is the most commonly cited argument for government deposit insurance and the careful government regulation it entails (or ought to entail). However, the money market mutual fund (MMMF) is a recent market innovation that completely solves this inherent instability problem of the payments system. As Kareken points out in his paper, MMMFs, like all mutual funds, are run proof since their obligations to their investors are simply pro rata shares in the current market value of the
منابع مشابه
الزامات وجود بیمه سپرده و ارتباط آن با مقاومت بانکی
مطالعه حاضر به بررسی رابطهی بین بیمهی سپرده بانکی و مقاومت بانکی در ایران با استفاده از دادههای پانل طی دوره 1394-1389 میپردازد. علاوه بر نرخ بیمه سپرده، متغیرهای نسبت مطالبات معوق به کل تسهیلات، کفایت سرمایه، اندازه بانک، بازده دارایی، نرخ رشد اقتصادی، نرخ رشد پول و نرخ تورم نیز به عنوان متغیرهای توضیحی استفاده شده است. جهت دستیابی به این هدف از بین بانکهای خصوصی 12 بانک انتخاب گردیده است...
متن کاملEXPLAINING BANK FAILURES : DEPOSIT INSURANCE , REGULATION AND EFFiCIENCY
This paper uses micro-level historical data to examine the causes of bank failure. For statecharactered Kansas banks during 19 10-28, time-to-failure is explicitly modeled using a proportional hazards framework. In addition to standard financial ratios, this study includes membership in the voluntary state deposit insurance system and measures of technical efficiency to explain bank failure. Th...
متن کاملDeposit Insurance and Bank Intermediation in the Long Run - July 2004
This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of deposit insurance on the growth of bank intermediation in the long run. We use a unique dataset capturing a variety of deposit insurance features across countries, such as coverage, premium structure, etc. and synthesize available information by means of principal component indices. This paper specifically addresses sample selection and en...
متن کاملThe Functional Approach To
Conventional wisdom contends that in order to assure financial stability, commercial banks require an elaborate federal regulatory and insurance structure and direct access to the central bank. Nonbank financial institutions apparently pose no threat and, therefore, merit less regulatory attention, no insurance, and no direct access to the central bank. Until relatively recently, the convention...
متن کاملOptimal Deposit Insurance
This paper characterizes the optimal level of deposit insurance (DI) when bank runs are possible. In a wide variety of environments, the optimal level of DI only depends on three sufficient statistics: the sensitivity of the likelihood of bank failure with respect to the level of DI, the utility loss caused by bank failure (which is a function of the drop in depositors’ consumption) and the exp...
متن کاملAllocating Bank Regulatory Powers: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision
Bank regulation in most countries encompasses a lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision. These functions are interrelated and therefore require coordination among the authorities responsible for them. These authorities, however, are often established with di®erent mandates, some of which are likely to be in con°ict. We consider these issues by studying the optimal institutional...
متن کامل