Naturalism and transcendentalism in the naturalization of phenomenology

In this article, an account is given of the relation between naturalism and transcendentalism in the current project of naturalizing phenomenology. This project usually takes the transcendental point of view to be in conflict with the naturalizing attitude and the contemporary sciences of cognition thus seem to require cutting Husserlian phenomenology from its anti-naturalist roots, i.e., naturalizing it. Yet, in abandoning both the anti-naturalist and the transcendental attitude, the naturalizing project has dropped the epistemological concerns and has concentrated on naturalizing phenomenology’s descriptive results concerning consciousness and subjective experience. This omission of Husserlian epistemology has a number of consequences for the naturalizing project itself. We want to examine these consequences, and, further, we want to see whether it is possible to combine a transcendental perspective with a naturalistic one. This amounts to asking whether it is possible to naturalize the transcendental–epistemological, and thus to give a naturalistic account, not only of subjective and conscious experience, but also of the epistemological part of Husserl’s project. r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Naturalism and transcendentalism This text aims to give an account of the relation between naturalism and transcendentalism in the current project of naturalizing phenomenology. Usually, this project takes the transcendental point of view to be in conflict with the naturalizing attitude. The general idea is that ‘‘Linking Husserlian descriptions of cognitive phenomena and the contemporary sciences of cognition thus seems to require cutting Husserlian phenomenology from its anti-naturalist roots, that is to say, naturalizing it’’ (Roy, Petitot, ARTICLE IN PRESS www.elsevier.com/locate/newideapsych 0732-118X/$ see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2006.06.002 E-mail address: [email protected]. URL: http://www.criticalphilosophy.UGent.be. Pachoud, & Varela, 1999, p. 43). Husserl’s anti-naturalist roots are usually identified with his transcendentalism, and it is true that both are closely linked. This link is an integral part of his epistemological project: to find an account of how human subjectivity and objectivity are related. Yet, the naturalizing project, in abandoning both the anti-naturalist and the transcendental attitude, has dropped the epistemological concerns and has concentrated on naturalizing phenomenology’s descriptive results concerning consciousness and subjective experience. This omission of Husserlian epistemology has a number of consequences for the naturalizing project itself. We want to examine these consequences, and, further, we want to see whether it is possible to combine a transcendental perspective with a naturalistic one. This amounts to asking whether it is possible to naturalize the transcendental–epistemological, and thus to give a naturalistic account, not only of subjective and conscious experience, but also of the epistemological part of Husserl’s project. Here is an outline of our argument. We start off with Husserl’s view of the relation between psychology and transcendental philosophy, in order to provide the basic lines of discussion. Second, we concentrate on the methodological part of naturalizing phenomenology. This means that we examine the role of the transcendental reduction, and try to show what a method without the transcendental reduction amounts to in the naturalizing project. In particular, we focus on the relation between a naturalized phenomenology and introspectionism. Third, we ask what the rights of a transcendental philosophy may be nowadays, and whether its basic problem of ‘‘the constitution of the objective world’’ is still valid. Fourth, we present the basic ideas of Petitot, who takes a physicalist attitude without abandoning transcendental philosophy. In his work, the transcendental problem of constitution is partly solved in a dialogue with Husserl, and the function of a transcendental philosophy in relation to the naturalistic attitude is reconsidered. Naturalizing Husserlian phenomenology indeed requires us to cut his phenomenology off from its anti-naturalist roots. Yet, this should not mean that it is to be cut off from Husserl’s epistemological and transcendental project. A naturalization of phenomenology should take Husserl’s epistemological–transcendental project into account, instead of exclusively focussing on subjective experience. 2. Husserl: the fateful separation of phenomenology and psychology ‘‘Natural human understanding and the objectivism rooted in it will view every transcendental philosophy as a flighty eccentricity, its wisdom as useless foolishness; or it will interpret it as psychology which seeks to convince itself that it is not psychology.’’ This is the view of Husserl (1970, p. 200), who considers the relation, or rather the separation, between transcendental philosophy and psychology as a fateful one. Transcendental philosophy had arisen out of reflections on conscious subjectivity. It meant to investigate how the world, both the scientific and the everyday one, is known, i.e. how it achieves ontic validity for the conscious subject. In other words, transcendental philosophy had recognized that the development of a ‘‘purely mental approach’’ to the world was necessary. ARTICLE IN PRESS We do not follow here Husserl’s Prolegomena to pure logic (Husserl, 1900–1901) or his Philosophy as a rigorous science (Husserl, 1910–1911), which are less balanced and more combative. H. De Preester / New Ideas in Psychology 24 (2006) 41–62 42