The assignment game with ill will and bounded rationality
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce ill will among the players of the classic two-sided assignment game of Shapley and Shubik, by letting each player’s utility be negatively correlated with the payoff of all players in his group. The new game is very complex, but under a certain assumption of bounded rationality we derive a straightforward notion of stable outcomes as certain conjectural equilibria. We prove that several well-known properties of the set of stable outcomes in the assignment game carry over to this new game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D62.
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