True and Useful: On the Structure of a Two Level Normative Theory

1. A PUZZLE IN ETHICS Philosophers engaged in normative ethics seek a principle stating interesting necessary and sufficient conditions for the moral rightness of actions. Utilitarians, Kantians, Rossians, virtue ethicists, and others defend different principles. But no matter which of these views a philosopher wants to defend, there is a certain difficulty that must be confronted. The problem is that these principles are “unimplementable”. A morally conscientious person who believes in one of these principles would naturally want to select actions that conform to the requirements of that principle. Yet no one has the kind of detailed information that would be required to implement any of these principles. Thus, the principles are unhelpful, or seemingly pointless: we cannot use any of them to determine in any helpful way what we are supposed to do. This problem has been discussed extensively in connection with utilitarianism. But it is important to see that other theories in normative ethics confront epistemic problems just as intractable as those faced by utilitarianism. On Ross’s theory we are required to perform an act that maximizes the balance of prima facie rightness over prima facie wrongness. Yet, as Ross himself made clear, we often cannot determine which of our alternatives would have this feature. i The same is true of various forms of virtue ethics and all the other popular theories in normative ethics. The implementability problem confronts anyone who advocates any of the popular theories in normative ethics.