Sequential Primaries, Pandering, and Information Transfer
نویسنده
چکیده
I analyze the effect of a sequential election system when the first voter has private information using a simple two candidate, two voter model in which the second voter is decisive. Both voters observe the candidates’ policy positions, but only the first voter observes which candidate is competent. I show that in equilibrium the candidates pander to the policy preferences of the first voter. Despite the pandering that it introduces, I show that a sequential election can be a Pareto improvement over a simultaneous election. JEL classification: D71, D72.
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