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In this paper I present a novel objection to ontological arguments. The argument concerns ontological arguments in general and has the general form of a reductio ad absurdum. Roughly, it rests on the fact that if a sound ontological argument were available, it would contradict the very nature of God. For God aims at maximising the development of human good qualities (including thus faith) and if a successful ontological argument were available, faith would become unnecessary. Lastly, I review several objections that can be raised against the present argument. The purpose of this paper is to describe a novel objection to ontological arguments. The argument does not address such or such ontological argument but rather concerns ontological arguments in general. The general structure of the argument is that of a reductio ad absurdum. It rests on the fact that if a sound ontological argument were successful, it would be in contradiction with the very nature of God. For it can be reasonably assumed that God, as a perfect being, aims at maximising all human good qualities and faith in particular. Under these conditions, if a successful ontological argument were available, there would be no need for faith. 2172/2*,&$/ $5*80(176 Ontological arguments are arguments that purport to demonstrate the existence of God from a priori considerations. They are intended to provide a proof of God’s existence on the basis of straightforward reasoning from indisputable premises. One characteristic feature of ontological arguments is that they are based on non-empirical grounds. If successful, an ontological argument would constitute a special case of proof of God’s existence, exclusively based on a priori considerations. Historically, ontological arguments come in several forms, the most ancient and well-known being that of St. Anselm. Descartes in his 0HGLWDWLRQV2 also provided an ontological argument, whose general trend is definitional. Lastly, it is worth mentioning Gödel's ontological argument, which has attracted recent interest, and modern variations provided by Norman Malcolm and Alvin Plantinga. For the sake of brevity, I will only sketch Anselm's and Descartes' ontological arguments. Anselm's conceptual ontological argument goes roughly as follows. Begin with the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived. However, if such a being does not exist, then a being than which no greater can be conceived and which in addition exists, can be conceived of. But this leads to outright contradiction, since the latter is a greater being than the former. Hence, a being than which no greater can be conceived exists. Consider, second, Descartes' definitional ontological argument. This last argument is very concise. It runs as follows. We can conceive of a being with every perfections. But existence is also a perfection. Hence, God exists. As Descartes points it out, this argument rests on the fact that existence is of the essence of God.