Sticks and carrots: encouraging open science at its source
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Open Science (OS) movement has been seen as an important facilitator for public participation in science. This has been underpinned by the assumption that widespread and free access to research outputs leads to (i) better and more efficient science, (ii) economic growth, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises wishing to capitalise on research findings and (iii) increased transparency of knowledge production and its outcomes. The latter in particular could function as a catalyst for public participation and engagement. Whether OS is likely to help realise these benefits, however, will depend on the emergence of systemic incentives for scientists to utilise OS in a meaningful manner. While some areas, the environmental sciences have a long tradition of open ethos, citizen inclusion and global collaborations, such activities need to be more systematically supported and promoted by funders and learned societies in order to improve scientific research and public participation.
منابع مشابه
Sticking with Carrots and Sticks (Sticking Points Aside): A Response to Ventakapuram, Goldberg, and Forrow
متن کامل
International Control of Nuclear Proliferation: beyond Carrots and Sticks
The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 40 Ronald B. Mitchell is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Oregon. His book Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance, published in 1994 by The MIT Press, received the 1995 International Studies Association Sprout Award for best book on international environmental politics. He has...
متن کاملTournaments, Risk Taking, and the Role of Carrots and Sticks
We study a Lazear-Rosen tournament in which players choose both work effort, which determines the mean of their output distribution, and the variance of output. The variance can be increased above its natural level but it is costly to do so. We show that tournaments involving more than two players generate incentives for risk-neutral players to pursue high-risk projects. However, the incorporat...
متن کاملHow to Commit (If You Must): Commitment Contracts and the Dual-Self Model
This paper studies how dual-self (Fudenberg and Levine (2006)) decision-makers can use commitment technologies to combat temptation and implement long-run optimal actions. I consider two types of such technologies: carrot contracts (rewards for ‘good’ behavior financed by borrowing from future consumption) and stick contracts (self imposed fines for ‘bad’ behavior). Both types of contracts can ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره 2 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015