The Core and Nucleolus Allocations in a Public Goods Economy with Taxation
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we study a public goods economy with a certain tax system to finance public goods, and show that the core is equal to the set of nucleolus allocations defined in this economy. Coalitions are allowed to levy a tax upon the complementary coalitions and to improve current allocations under a rule restricting the resulting allocations, which corresponds to the effectiveness form due to Rosenthal [13]. We also show some sufficient conditions for the core to be nonempty.
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