A Cybernetic Metaphysics

Metaphysics is supposed to answer the question “What is the nature of things?”, or something like that. Before trying to answer this question we should ask a counterquestion: “What is meant by the nature in this context?” Indeed, we want to understand clearly the meaning of the question before getting involved in answering. In this paper we interpret the metaphysical quest from the vantage point of what we denote as the cybernetic epistemology ([Tur90]), its main principle being that the meaning of language constructions is defined by the extent to which it can be used as a model of a part of the world, or as a means of constructing such models. Then we present the beginnings of a metaphysics inspired by the cybernetical approach to the world, which is seen in terms of functioning, organization and control, in contrast with the view of the physicist, who features space, time and matter. Starting from these premises we come to a philosophy where ontological priority belongs to action. A metalanguage is still a language, and a metatheory a theory. Metamathematics is a branch of mathematics. Is metaphysics a branch of physics? ‘Meta’ in Greek means over, and – since when you jump over something you find yourself behind or after it – it is also understood as behind and after. The word ‘metaphysics’ is said to originate from the mere fact that the corresponding part of Aristotle’s work was positioned right after the part called “physics”. But it is not unlikely that the term won a ready acceptance as denoting this part of philosophy because it conveyed the purpose of metaphysics, which is to reach beyond the nature (‘physis’) as we perceive it, and to discover the “true nature” of things, their ultimate essence and the reason for being. Such a theory would obviously be priceless for judging and constructing more specific physical theories. understand it in the 20-th century. A metatheory is a theory, which considered as an object of comes into being, how it is metaphysician, in contrast, about the world, as a If so, metaphysics should take as honorable a place in physics as metamathematics in mathematics. But this is very far from being the case. It would be more accurate to describe the situation as exactly opposite. Popularly (and primarily by the “working masses” of scientists and engineers), metaphysics is considered as almost opposite to physics, and utterly useless for it (if not for any reasonable purpose). We shall argue below that this attitude is a hangover from the long outdated forms of empiricism and positivism.