Reframing research on intuitive science knowledge

Education research has devoted significant effort to understanding the intuitive knowledge students bring to bear in reasoning about formal science. In addition to documenting the specific content of students’ conceptions in particular domains, some researchers attempt to make more general claims, both within and across domains, about the nature of intuitive knowledge. These attempts involve an implicit assumption that the character and function of all intuitive knowledge is the same – that there is a single kind of thing called “intuitive science knowledge” that can be singularly characterized. The purpose of this work is to call that assumption into question, and we present examples to highlight our concerns. We propose a theoretical framework that provides a way to more carefully frame our research on intuitive science knowledge and demonstrate how it can be used to bring additional clarity to current discussions in the literature. Research on Intuitive Science Knowledge Both science education researchers and instructors have long held an interest in identifying and understanding students’ prior conceptions. Work in a variety of domains has characterized students’ understanding of science topics ranging from the shape of the earth (e.g., Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992) to elementary mechanics (e.g., McCloskey, 1983) to biological categorization (e.g., Carey, 1985). This research is often motivated by the belief that students possess intuitive knowledge of science content – knowledge gained outside of formal instruction – that impacts how they learn formal science content. It is hoped that finding out more about the intuitive knowledge itself will help make classroom instruction more effective and meaningful. The desire to understand more about students’ intuitive knowledge of science has largely been translated into research agendas that seek to document the specific contents of intuitive knowledge as it relates to particular scientific domains. For example, in their work on the shape of the earth, Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) describe the particular alternative models possessed by students. However, in some cases, researchers have attempted to address questions that have broader import. They have attempted, for example, to describe the character of intuitive knowledge in particular areas. Even more broadly, some researchers have attempted to draw conclusions, which span domains, about the nature of intuitive science knowledge. For example, the literature is rife with arguments over the form of intuitive knowledge – whether it is more theory or model-like or whether it is fragmented (e.g., diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004). In attempting to draw conclusions that span domains, there is an assumption that the character and function of all intuitive knowledge is the same – that there is a single kind of thing called “intuitive science knowledge” that can be compared straightforwardly across all domains, and can be singularly characterized. The purpose of this paper is to call this assumption into question. We argue that the various attempts to document student conceptions have often been focused on different kinds of knowledge, with very different origins, function, and character. As a result, many attempts to draw conclusions about intuitive knowledge that span domains are, at best, incoherent. As a remedy to this situation, we propose a framework that we hope can bring new clarity to attempts to draw more general conclusions about intuitive science knowledge. In what follows, we first lay out some reasons for concern. Then we describe our new framework. Finally, we show how the framework can be applied to help bring clarity to some of the major debates in the research literature. Our approach in this brief paper will be purely theoretical. We will not present any new data, although we will draw on brief examples from the literature to illustrate some points. We believe that the issues are clear and dramatic enough that extensive reference to data is not needed. Instead we see this paper as a chance to step back and reflect on some of the fundamental assumptions of research on intuitive science knowledge.