Collusion in markets with imperfect price information on both sides
نویسنده
چکیده
The paper considers tacit collusion in markets which are not fully transparent on both sides. Consumers only detect prices with some probability before deciding which rm to purchase from, and each rm only detects the other rms price with some probability. Increasing transparency on the producer side facilitates collusion, while it increasing transparency on the consumer side makes collusion more di¢ cult. Conditions are given under which increases in a common factor, a¤ecting transparency positively on both sides, are pro-competitive. With two standard information technologies, this is so, when rms are easier to inform than consumers.
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