Autonomy and Idealism in and after Kant

Regardless of one’s particular philosophical interests and convictions, it is evident that the notion of autonomy is an important one. However, agreement about the nature of autonomy and about what it requires has proven elusive in contemporary discussions. In Kant and the Fate of Autonomy Karl Ameriks addresses this impasse by going back to the historical roots of this notion in Kant and arguing that many contemporary conceptions of autonomy are based on misunderstandings of Kant’s position, misunderstandings that first arose in his immediate successors, Reinhold, Fichte, and Hegel. However, Ameriks does not aim merely to set the historical record straight; he wants to suggest that Kant’s actual position on autonomy is much more attractive philosophically than either what he refers to as “pure Kantian” conceptions (such as those developed by Rawls and his students, who have “purified” Kant’s position by extracting what they take to be its essential core from extraneous historical details that contaminate it) or positions that are similar in basic respects to those of Rorty, Taylor, Larmore, and other postKantians. That Ameriks is able to combine remarkable sensitivity toward an extremely broad range of obscure texts with striking clarity and philosophical sophistication in evaluating the positions and arguments laid bare by his exegetical analyses makes his book an extraordinarily rich contribution to our contemporary philosophical landscape. I begin my discussion by presenting Ameriks’s interpretation of Kant as it contrasts with other familiar interpretations. I then portray his interpretation of how Reinhold, Fichte, and Hegel reacted to Kant as well as his critical evaluation of these reactions. Finally, I discuss three controversial issues that