Auction Protocols for Resource Allocations in Ad-Hoc Grids

Different auction-based approaches have been used to allocate resources in Grids, but none of them provide the design choice for a specific economic model while considering the interest of all participants in the market. In this paper, we implement an auction-based framework for producer and consumer matchmaking in an ad-hoc Grid. In ad-hoc Grids, where the availability of resources and tasks is highly dynamic, the producers and consumers have to compete for providing and employing the resources. The framework is used to assess the usefulness of a particular mechanism using a set of criteria in different network conditions. We present the performance analysis of different auction mechanisms namely First-Price, Vickrey and Double Auctions in a many-to-many manner. The evaluation is performed in terms of throughput, consumer and producer surplus, and uncertainty measure for obtaining required resources in different network conditions.