A Review of Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa, The Bounds of Cognition
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Lawrence A. Shapiro University of Wisconsin – Madison Department of Philosophy 5185 H.C. White Hall Madison, WI 53706 [email protected] REVIEW OF: The Bounds of Cognition, Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa, 2008, Malden: Blackwell Publishing. Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa have done a fine thing in this short and engaging challenge to the hypothesis of extended cognition. In brief, they have (i) summarized and documented the main arguments in favor of extended cognition; (ii) criticized these arguments; (iii) suggested a theory of cognition according to which claims of extended cognition should be judged; and (iv) offered some thoughts on the direction extended cognition should take in the future. Some of the criticisms Adams and Aizawa offer are obvious on a moment’s reflection, and I suspect that proponents of the arguments that they target are likely to cry foul. No doubt Adams and Aizawa had this suspicion as well: most arguments they examine are well-documented, with quotations aplenty with which to support their reading. Philosophers wishing to respond to many of Adams and Aizawa’s charges are going to have a difficult time making the case that they have been misinterpreted (we’ll see below that Adams and Aizawa are not as diligent when it comes to arguments for what they call the hypothesis of extended cognition). Thus, proponents of extended cognition who wish to meet the challenges set in The Bounds of Cognition face the
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Review Essay Systems, Functions, and Intrinsic Natures: On Adams and Aizawa’s The Bounds of Cognition
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