Research Area Markets and Political Economy Research Unit Competitiveness and Industrial Change Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt Und Politische Ökonomie Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Und Industrieller Wandel Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper investigates how the formation of larger buyers affects a supplier's profits and, by doing so, his incentives to undertake non-contractible activities. We first identify two channels of buyer power, which allows larger buyers to obtain discounts. We subsequently examine the effects of buyer power on the supplier's incentives and on social welfare. Contrary to some informal claims in the policy debate on buyer power, we find that the exercise of buyer power-even though reducing supplier's profits-may often increase a supplier's incentive to undertake welfare enhancing activities. Investitionsanstrengungen auf der Herstellerseite induziert.
منابع مشابه
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