Modelling the Birth and Death of Cartels with an Application to Evaluating Antitrust Policy∗
نویسنده
چکیده
One of the primary challenges to measuring the impact of antitrust policy on collusion is that the cartel population is unobservable; we observe only the population of discovered cartels. To address this challenge, a model of cartel creation and dissolution is developed to endogenously derive the populations of cartels and discovered cartels. It is then shown how one can infer the impact of antitrust policy on the population of cartels by measuring its impact on the population of discovered cartels. In particular, the change in the distribution on the duration of discovered cartels could be informative in assessing whether a new antitrust policy is reducing the latent rate of cartels. ∗I appreciate the comments of Rune Stenbacka and an inspiring calculation presented by Maggie Levenstein and Valerie Suslow at the 2006 International Industrial Organization Conference. The support of the National Science Foundation (SES-0516943) is gratefully acknowledged.
منابع مشابه
Modeling the Birth and Death of Cartels with an Application to Evaluating Competition Policy
One of the primary challenges to measuring the impact of antitrust or competition policy on collusion is that the cartel population is unobservable; we observe only the population of discovered cartels. To address this challenge, a model of cartel creation and dissolution is developed to endogenously derive the populations of cartels and discovered cartels. With this theory, one can infer the i...
متن کاملModelling the Birth and Death of Cartels with an Application to Evaluating Competition Policy∗
One of the primary challenges to measuring the impact of antitrust or competition policy on collusion is that the cartel population is unobservable; we observe only the population of discovered cartels. To address this challenge, a model of cartel creation and dissolution is developed to endogenously derive the populations of cartels and discovered cartels. With this theory, one can infer the i...
متن کاملA Note on “Modeling the Birth and Death of Cartels with An Application to Evaluating Competition Policy” by Harrington and Chang (2009)
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