Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism

Studies of terrorism in general and suicide terrorism in particular tend to view terrorist groups independently+ However, what if the propensity for a terrorist group to adopt suicide tactics depends in part on its external linkages and the relationship between the organizational capabilities required to adopt the innovation and the organizational capabilities of the group? This article shows that the organizational change requirements for adopting an innovation significantly influence the overall adoption pattern, along with interlinkages between groups+ Additionally, evaluating the universe of terrorist groups, not only those groups that adopted suicide terrorism but those that did not, shows that Pape’s key variable of interest, occupation, does not significantly predict the adoption of suicide terrorism+ Thinking about suicide terrorism as a special case of diffusion in the military area—an innovation for nonstate groups—can help bring the study of suicide terrorism further into the mainstream and highlight how the phenomenon has not just differences, but similarities, to other innovations+ In the mid-1990s, after the first World Trade Center attack, Osama Bin Laden apparently made an important decision about the future of the burgeoning terrorist group now known as Al Qaeda+ Up until the mid-1990s, Al Qaeda had played a major role in Salafi Jihadi terrorist operations around the world, but its involvement was mostly behind the scenes+ Al Qaeda provided financing for operations, trained fighters from affiliated groups, and smuggled weapons to sympathetic parties+ However, Bin Laden, the group’s leader, determined that it was time for Al Qaeda itself to engage in a major attack and step out of the shadows+ When planning began for the operation that was to become the East African embassy bombings of 1998, Bin Laden sent some of Al Qaeda’s top military commanders and operatives, including some in the Kenya cell, to Hezbollah to learn from one of the most successful terrorist groups of the last twenty years+ Even though Bin Laden’s Sunni Salafi beliefs led him to clear theological disagreements with the Shia-affiliated HezbolThe author would like to thank Iain Johnston, Stephanie Kaplan, Ed Mansfield, Stephen P+ Rosen, Erin Simpson, and Allan Stam for their helpful comments and feedback+ All remaining errors are the author’s+ Appendices available at: http:00sites+google+com0site0michaelchorowitz0+ International Organization 64, Winter 2010, pp+ 33–64 © 2010 by The IO Foundation+ doi:10+10170S0020818309990233 lah, and Hezbollah had not actually conducted a suicide attack in years, Bin Laden considered them the experts and sent his people to learn+ Furthermore, Bin Laden purportedly told his operatives to specifically study the Hezbollah suicide bombing of the U+S+ Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon in 1983+ His operatives went, took careful notes, and returned with the operational concepts and knowledge necessary for the 1998 embassy bombings+ This story illustrates key concepts related to nonstate actors, innovation, and diffusion in the suicide attack case+ First, sometimes desire is not enough to adopt an innovation+ Even though Al Qaeda had money, committed members, and weapons, it sent its members to Hezbollah, a suicide attack innovator, to pick up the tacit knowledge necessary to conduct its own operations+ Second, organizational capacity matters+ Al Qaeda lacked a prior operational history, making them extremely flexible when it came to designing the embassy bombings+ Without an operational past that caused them to privilege certain attack strategies, it was easier to branch into a new area of operations such as suicide bombing+ Third, it is impossible to tell the story of how military power matters without understanding how it spreads+ The connection between Al Qaeda and Hezbollah became a critical node in the spread of suicide attacks around the world, connecting a key innovator in the 1980s, Hezbollah, to the primary exporter of knowledge about suicide attacks from the mid-1990s to the present, Al Qaeda+ Studies of terrorism in general and suicide attacks in particular have tended to view terrorist groups independently+ Pape argues that foreign occupation and religious differences between the terrorist group and the perceived occupying state drive suicide bombing+ Similarly, Bloom’s market share and outbidding theory presumes groups adopt suicide attacks based on their need to compete for influence with other local terrorist groups+ While each author mentions the mass of interrelationships between many terrorist groups, they generally assume the independence of each observation in the “data” of suicide terrorist attacks across campaigns+ But what if the propensity for a terrorist group to adopt suicide tactics depends in part on its external linkages and whether it has the organizational capability to adopt the innovation? If organizational factors and diffusion processes influence who adopts at what times, ignoring these factors risks missing critical information about behavior+ Using a diffusion framework to analyze suicide attacks builds on recent work on the spread of economic and financial policies as well as domestic political regimes+ The evidence presented below shows that organizational concepts taken from business innovation studies and the conventional military literature are helpful in 1+ The story is taken from the 9011 Commission Report, which cites multiple U+S+ intelligence briefs and court testimony ~National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004, 67– 68, 470–71!+ 2+ Pape 2005, 45– 47+ 3+ Bloom 2005+ 4+ Bloom recognizes linkages between groups within disputes like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict+ 5+ For example, see the International Organization symposium on the diffusion of liberalism ~International Organization 2006!+ 34 International Organization