Etan Green – CV

Judges, referees, and other arbitrators are tasked with making objective decisions based on narrow criteria, but they may also care about the consequences of their rulings for others and themselves. Do the consequences of arbitration distort the decisions of arbitrators? We examine over onemillion decisionsmade by umpires inMajor League Baseball, which directs and incentivizes umpires to make binary decisions according to a single, objective criterion: the location of the pitch. Using state-of-the-art pitch location technology, we find that all  umpires in our sample distort their directive by avoiding the option that wouldmore strongly change the expected outcome of the game. is impact aversion is consistent with a preference for anonymity, which leads umpires to avoid options that could aract scrutiny even at the expense of their own monetary self-interest. Umpires face public criticism for mistakes that disrupt the course of the game; impact-averse umpires avoid scrutiny by avoiding game-changing options that could be mistaken. Implications for judges are discussed.