Hardware Trojan Side-Channels Based on Physical Unclonable Functions
نویسندگان
چکیده
The separation design and fabrication process in the semiconductor industry leads to potential threats such as trojan side-channels (TSCs). In this paper we design a new family of TSCs from physical unclonable functions (PUFs). In particular, a dedicated attack on the PRESENT block cipher is described by using our PUF-based TSCs. Finally we analyze the performance of our PUF-based TSCs and discuss other potential applications.
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