On the Purification of Nash Equilibria of Large Games∗
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider Salim Rashid’s asymptotic version of David Schmeidler’s theorem on the purification of Nash equilibria. We show that, in contrast to what is stated, players’ payoff functions have to be selected from an equicontinuous family in order for Rashid’s theorem to ∗I wish to thank Mário Páscoa and Myrna Wooders for very helpful comments. All remaining errors are, of course, mine. †Address: Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia, Campus de Campolide, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal; Phone: (351) 21 38
منابع مشابه
Purification of Bayesian-Nash Equilibria in Large Games with Compact Type and Action Spaces∗
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