Breaking the Estream Finalists and AES Modes of Operation Faster than Exhaustive Search

Time-memory-data (TMD) trade-off attack is a wellstudied technique that has been applied on many stream and block ciphers. Current TMD attacks by Biryukov-Shamir (BSTMD), Hong-Sarkar (HS-TMD) and Dunkelman-Keller (DKTMD) has been applied to ciphers like Grain-v1 and AES-192/256 modes of operation to break them with online complexity faster than exhaustive search. However, there is still a limitation because the precomputation is slower than exhaustive search for these attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new TMD attack that can break Estream ciphers and block cipher standards with both precomputation and online attack complexity faster than exhaustive search. The attack works whenever the IV length is shorter than the key length. Therefore, Estream ciphers like Grainv1, Rabbit, Salsa20, SOSEMANUK, MICKEY and block cipher standards like AES-192/256, KASUMI, IDEA, SAFER can all be broken. We also point out that our attack rely on less stringent requirements than known attacks on stream and block ciphers such as cube attack and related-key differential/boomerang attacks. Finally, we adapt our attack to the multi-user setting and show that the attack complexities can be reduced further. Zenner had proposed that stream ciphers should be designed with IV length equal to key length to resist TMD attacks in the multi-user setting. We show that this requirement is not sufficient for ciphers like Trivium, AES-128 and HC-128 where IV length equal key length can all be broken by our multi-user TMD attack. keywords: Stream Ciphers, Block Ciphers, Time-MemoryData Trade-Off Attack.